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China’s challenge to international tax rules and implications for global 
economic governance 
 
Twentieth century institutions of global economic governance face a profound 
challenge adapting to the rise of emerging markets, especially China. This is 
especially the case for an international tax regime based on norms that favour 
capital exporting states, and whose institutional home is the OECD. To understand 
the nature of the challenge posed by China, we focus on its engagement with a 
foundational norm of the international tax regime: the arm’s length principle 
(ALP). We show that China’s approach to tax cooperation is characterised by a set 
of apparent contradictions: conciliatory language hides an assault on the ALP; 
rhetoric of common cause with developing countries is contradicted by actions that 
maximise only China’s own share of the tax ‘pie’; a willingness to court the OECD 
relies on the leverage gained from flirtation with outside options.  In these respects 
China appears increasingly to be using its market power to seek special privileges 
within international regimes, in ways that mirror the historical actions of the 
United States.   
Keywords: China, foreign direct investment, global governance, OECD, taxation, 
emerging markets 








How will the rise of China and other large emerging markets affect the liberal economic 
order created in the last century, largely by OECD states? Will existing institutions of 
economic cooperation be transformed to accommodate rising powers, embraced by them 
in their existing form, or fall by the wayside? This puzzle has motivated a vibrant strand 
of international relations scholarship in recent years.1 With a predominant focus on trade 
governance, as well as on the global system of reserve currencies and the overseas 
development aid architecture, this literature appears to be settling on a consensus that 
China is a cautious reformist, rather than seeking more dramatic change.2 Nonetheless, 
                                                 
1 See eg: Miles Kahler, “Rising powers and global governance: negotiating change in a resilient 
status quo”, International Affairs 89: 3 (2013), pp. 711–29; Matthew D. Stephen, “Emerging 
Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance,” Global Governance, Vol. 23 (2017): 
483-502; Françoise Nicolas, “China and the Global Economic Order: A Discreet Yet 
Undeniable Contestation,” China Perspectives, Vol. 2 (2016): 7-14; Naná De Graaff and 
Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, “US–China Relations and the Liberal World Order: Contending 
Elites, Colliding Visions?,” International Affairs 94, no. 1 (2018): 113–31; Amitav 
Acharya, “Can Asia Lead? Power Ambitions and Global Governance in the Twenty-First 
Century,” International Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 4 (2011): 859; Xingye Jin, David Daokui Li 
and Shuyu Wu, “How Will China Shape the World Economy?” China Economic Review, 
Vol. 40 (2016): 272-280. 
2 See, eg: Jing Gu, John Humphrey, and Dirk Messner, “Global Governance and Developing 
Countries: The Implications of the Rise of China,” World Development 36, no. 2 (2008): 
274–92; Yang Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements: Is China Exceptional?,” 
Review of International Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 238–61; Kristen Hopewell, 
“Different Paths to Power: The Rise of Brazil, India and China at the World Trade 
Organization,” Review of International Political Economy 22, no. 2 (2015): 311–38.  See, 
eg: Peter Ferdinand and Jue Wang, “China and the IMF: From Mimicry Towards Pragmatic 
International Institutional Pluralism,” International Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 4 (2013): 910; Hai 




various observers have noted increasing deadlock on the global stage arising from the 
proliferation of divergent preferences in global forums.3 
 
However, by focusing on a cross-cutting narrative, this emerging consensus does not help 
us to understand how Chinese strategies may vary across issues areas and over time.4  
The impact of China’s rise in a given area of global economic governance will be 
influenced by three variables: the distribution of interests between states that determines 
the lines of conflict and cooperation, the determinants of state power and their 
distribution, and the problem structure of the issue in question. Interacting with each of 
these is change over time. The changing distribution of economic power is a dynamic 
process that interacts with profound changes underway in the nature of economic 
production, trade and capital flows. Countries’ interests in this environment are not static, 
but evolving, just as are their capabilities. 
 
We illustrate this schema using an area of global economic governance that has been 
frequently overlooked in international relations scholarship, but has become increasingly 
politicised in recent years: international taxation, and in particular, the division of 
multinational firms’ taxable profits between states. China’s interests in this area are 
described by Chinese officials as ‘unique and inimitable’, as they are rapidly shifting 
from those of a capital importer and low value-added manufacturer towards those of a 
capital exporter with aspirations in high value-added industries, and a large consumer 
                                                                                                                                                 
Global Economic Governance,” Chinese Political Science Review, Vol. 1 (2016): 754-778. 
Shahar Hameiri and Lee Jones, “China Challenges Global Governance? Chinese 
International Development Finance and the AIIB,” International Affairs 94, no. 3 (2018): 
573–93; Rosemary Foot and Andrew Walter, “Global Norms and Major State Behaviour: 
The Cases of China and the United States,” European Journal of International Relations 19, 
no. 2 (2013): 329–52. 
3 Stephen, “Emerging Powers and Emerging Trends in Global Governance” 
4 One of the few attempts to compare across issue areas is Foot and Walter, “Global Norms and 




market. This defies traditional dividing lines between capital-exporting OECD states and 
capital-importing developing countries. Turning to the determinants of power, China’s 
growing and profitable market, as well as its critical place within global value chains, 
allows it to chart its own path without fear of market sanctions that less powerful 
countries might face from unilateral actions.  Pulling against these dynamics is a 
constant: the nature of the issue area itself.  This area of tax cooperation is a coordination 
game with distributive conflict, which is characterized by very strong pressures for global 
cooperation.5 This distinguishes tax from the issue areas that have dominated the existing 
literature on China in global governance, which have tended to be prisoner’s dilemma 
issues with stronger incentives for states to defect. 
 
The consequence is a distinct set of Chinese strategies, which may reveal much about the 
evolution of both international tax debates and China’s broader global ambitions.  On one 
hand, China has engaged actively with existing, and historically western-led, institutions 
of global tax governance, offering vocal support for an unprecedented reform of 
international tax rules led by the OECD. On the other hand, within those negotiations 
China has adopted a quietly aggressive stance, launching a subtle, but profound, 
challenge to OECD orthodoxy through the concept of ‘Location Specific Advantages’ 
(LSAs), which allows it to secure an expanded share of global tax revenues. Presented as 
a narrow intervention in a highly technical debate, LSAs in fact represent a potentially 
profound challenge to OECD orthodoxy, and reveal China’s growing power and 
assertiveness in seeking to shape global economic governance within multilateral fora. 
Meanwhile, behind a rhetoric of solidarity with developing countries, China has 
increasingly appeared to pursue its narrow national self-interest, which diverges from that 
of economies with less market power. This Janus-faced approach to tax cooperation 
mirrors the historical actions of the United States. 
 
                                                 





The remainder of the paper begins with a review of the literature on China’s role in 
global economic governance.  Section three then discusses the institutions of international 
tax cooperation, introducing the ‘Arm’s Length Principle’ (ALP), on which the analysis 
is focused.  The following two sections turn to analyzing China’s engagement with the 
reform of international tax rules, with a focus on its advocacy for reliance on ‘Location 
Specific Advantages’ in allocating taxing rights across countries. The final section 
concludes. 
 
China, global economic governance and international taxation 
 
A growing literature has asked whether major emerging markets economies are likely to 
cooperate with existing institutions of global economic governance, or adopt a more 
conflictual stance. China is seen as having been comparatively cautious, neither playing a 
major agenda-setting role nor seeking to make the system more inclusive for developing 
countries writ large, despite its rhetoric.6 Several explanations have been offered: lack of 
consensus on a new national role, ‘pre-emptive restraint’ to avoid a backlash which could 
threaten its economic growth, a desire for sovereignty and independence, and limited 
domestic capacity to coordinate among interest groups and government institutions.7  
                                                 
6 Much of the research on China’ relationship to developing countries has focused on 
development financing. For instance, China’s One Belt One Road initiative explicitly lays 
out that Chinese financing is the servant of national strategy, rather than purporting to serve 
other developing countries. Hongying Wang and Erik French, “China in Global Economic 
Governance,” Asian Policy Review, Vol. 9 (2014): 254-271. See also David Murphy, “One 
Belt One Road: International Development Finance with Chinese Characteristics,” in 
Pollution, ed. Gloria Davis, Jeremy Goldkorn, Luigi Tomba (Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 2016): 249-250.  
7 Jörn-Carsten Gottwald and Sebastian Bersick, “The Domestic Sources of China’s New Role in 
Reforming Global Capitalism,” International Politics, Vol. 52, No. 6 (2015): 779. Acharya, 




Perhaps most studied has been China’s engagement with the WTO, where it has moved 
cautiously, while broader disagreements amongst key WTO members have contributed to 
deadlock.8   
 
That said, China has become more ambitious over time, sometimes adopting regional 
strategies that circumvent – but do not directly confront – existing western-led 
institutions.  From the 2000s, following its accession to the WTO and the Asian financial 
crisis, China is argued to have shifted from a ‘learning’ mode to one characterised by 
strategic interventions in areas of particular importance.9  In turn, recent accounts have 
highlighted China’s pursuit of “dual-track” strategies: working both within and around 
existing western-led institutions.10  China has responded to WTO deadlock both by 
cooperating and by expanding regional economic integration, such as the Belt and Road 
Initiative.11  Similarly, China has championed parallel institutions to the IMF and World 
                                                 
8 Eg. Gu et al, “Global Governance and Developing Countries”; Jiang, “China’s Pursuit of Free 
Trade Agreements”; Hopewell, “Different Paths to Power”  
9 Gregory Chin & Ramesh Thakur (2010) Will China Change the Rules of Global Order?, The 
Washington Quarterly, 33:4, 119-138; Margaret M. Pearson, ‘‘The Major Multilateral 
Economic Institutions Engage China,’’ in A.I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging 
China: The Management of an Emerging Power (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 207—
234; Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘‘Is China a Status Quo Power?’’ International Security 27, no. 
4 (Spring 2003); Nicholas Lardy, Integrating China into the World Economy (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002). 
10 Li Yamin and Wang Hao, “China and Emerging Economies in Global Financial Governance: 
Legitimacy, Accountability and Democracy,” Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University 
(Science), Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 2016): 200.  
11 Ferdinand, Peter, “Westward ho—the China dream and ‘one belt, one road’: Chinese foreign 




Bank – the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – that 
nonetheless fit alongside existing bodies, rather than challenging them directly.12   
 
While this literature provides a persuasive description of the status quo, two forward-
looking questions demand further consideration.  The first is the possibility of sharp 
differences in Chinese strategies across issues areas, dependent on three things: economic 
interests, power dynamics and problem structure.  China may seek cooperation in some 
issue areas alongside conflict in others, while developing tailored strategies to pursue its 
national interests. So called “dual-track” strategies have reflected this diversity, as China 
has sought to cooperate globally while acting more unilaterally at the regional level.  Yet 
these “dual track” strategies in relation to trade and development finance reflect particular 
combinations of interests, capabilities and problem structures. 
 
The second question relates to changes over time: while China has played a cautious role 
to date, how likely is this to persist into the future? Changes in the global economy are 
driving intertwined shifts in China’s interests and its global influence.  Whereas rapid 
growth was initially built on large inflows of FDI to support low value-added 
manufacturing, China became a net capital exporter in 2016 – and is now the third largest 
capital exporter in the world.  Official government policy is now focused on supporting a 
shift toward higher technology and higher value-added economic activities.  These shifts 
are likely to reshape China’s global interests as well as its capability to further them. 
 
The case of international tax rules sheds light on both questions, and challenges common 
narratives in the existing literature.  Contrary to the prevailing sense of growing deadlock 
in global institutions, tax cooperation has recently seen multilateral cooperation 
unprecedented in its depth and breadth.  This has been led by the Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (BEPS) project, launched in 2012 by the G20 and OECD, the recommendations 
                                                 
12 New Chinese aid institutions, for example, regularly reference the Bretton Woods 




from which have been endorsed by well over 100 countries. In turn, China’s interests and 
negotiating power around international tax rules are rapidly shifting. Its crucial position 
in global value chains has progressively increased its negotiating power, while a shift 
toward capital exports and a focus on high value-added activities predicts a realignment 
of its interests away from maximizing the taxation of multinational firms operating in 
China toward supporting Chinese multinationals investing abroad – potentially aligning it 
more closely with OECD countries.  
 
Meanwhile, the nature of the global cooperation problem differs from much of the 
existing literature.  In contrast to widely studied trade negotiations, international taxation 
presents significantly stronger incentives for global consensus on rules, making them 
relatively resistant to “dual track” strategies.13 Yet the global tax landscape also remains 
characterised by significant distributional conflict.14 The next section elaborates. 
 
The arm’s length principle, international tax soft law and developing countries 
 
“International tax rules” refers not to hard law codified in a global treaty, but a set of 
general principles and guidelines that have evolved over the past century to guide 
taxation of businesses operating across borders.  These ‘rules’ have nonetheless taken on 
the power of widely accepted soft law, almost universally followed in setting national 
policies and adjudicating international disputes.15 In turn, the norms underpinning 
                                                 
13 Rixen. The Political Economy of International Tax Governance.  
14 Richard Eccleston and Helen Smith, “The G20, BEPS and the Future of International Tax 
Governance” in Dietsch and Rixen (eds), Global Tax Governance. 
15 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S, International Tax as International Law (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Eduardo Baistrocchi, ‘Tax Disputes under Institutional Instability: 




international tax rules have remained remarkably stable since the early twentieth century, 
even as periodic reforms refresh their application. 
 
International tax rules seek to address a simple question: how should the right to tax the 
global profits of multinational companies (MNCs) be divided across countries, while also 
preventing tax avoidance and evasion that exploits gaps and mismatches between 
national tax systems? Absent coordination, both sets of undesirable outcomes are likely:  
in some cases ‘double taxation’ by respective governments, each trying to claim a larger 
share of the tax ‘pie’, will deter cross-border investment, while multinational firms will in 
other cases exploit gaps in the system to reduce the overall taxes they pay.  This is a 
classic coordination problem: there are powerful in-built incentives for states to organize 
themselves around a shared set of rules and practices, despite distributional conflict over 
their details.16  Given these characteristics, the adoption of a set of common rules by 
economically powerful OECD countries has historically dictated their adoption by other 
states, who otherwise risk exclusion from global economic networks.17   
 
A foundational principle of OECD soft law is the arm’s length principle (ALP), which 
says that, to divide the profits of an MNC across countries for tax purposes, its 
subsidiaries should be treated as if they were unrelated economic entities.  Profits are 
allocated between subsidiaries by pricing transactions between them as if those same 
transactions were undertaken between unrelated economic actors at market prices.  The 
                                                 
16 Thomas Rixen, ‘From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax Competition: Explaining the Institutional 
Trajectory of International Tax Governance’, Review of International Political Economy, 18 
(2011), 197–227; Rixen, The Political Economy of International Tax Governance; Radaelli, 
“Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship” 
17 Philipp Genschel and Thomas Rixen, ‘Settling and Unsettling the Transnational Legal Order of 
International Taxation’, in Transnational Legal Orders, ed. by Terence C. Halliday and 
Gregory Shaffer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Allison Christians ‘Global 
Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least Developed Countries’, University of 




OECD argues that as long as those internal transactions are priced appropriately, the ALP 
offers a technocratic and unbiased approach to dividing profits.  In the words of OECD 
secretariat staff: “The arm's length principle is sound in theory since it provides the 
closest approximation of the workings of the open market.”18 The ALP thus aims to 
remove explicit distributional conflict from multilateral discussions. 
 
In practice, however, the ALP has become a lightning rod for criticism, much of it 
focused on whether the ALP may implicitly or explicitly disadvantage developing 
countries, thus challenging claims of distributional neutrality.19 The first reason is the 
difficulty of enforcing the ALP in developing countries, which under OECD rules 
requires finding ‘comparable’ open market transactions for internal transactions within an 
MNC.  This approach offers MNCs significant scope to set transfer prices high or low in 
ways that artificially shift profits into low-tax jurisdictions, especially in areas such as 
trade in intangible assets – most notably intellectual property and expertise – for which 
no comparable open market transactions may exist.  Policing these transfer prices is 
difficult enough for OECD tax administrations, and near impossible for many developing 
country tax authorities. The latter lag behind both on administrative capacity and access 
to information about comparable market transactions.  The end result is rules that, 
whatever their theoretical appeal, in practice undermine collection in poorer countries. 
                                                 
18 Joseph L Andrus, Mary C Bennett, and Caroline Silberztein, ‘The Arm’s-Length Principle and 
Developing Economies’, Tax Management Transfer Pricing Report (Washington: 
Bloomberg BNA, 2011), 495 
19 Tim Buttner and Matthias Thiemann, ‘Breaking Regime Stability? The Politicization of 
Expertise in the OECD G20 Process on BEPS and the Potential Transformation of 
International Taxation’, Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 7 (2017); Matti 
Ylönen and Teivo Teivainen, ‘Politics of Intra-Firm Trade: Corporate Price Planning and 




Recent estimates suggest that the impact of MNC profit shifting on tax revenues is about 
twice as large in developing countries, as a share of GDP.20  
 
A second area of criticism proposes that the OECD’s interpretation of the ALP naturally 
advantages capital exporting countries, and owners of intellectual property, while 
disadvantaging capital importers.  Under OECD guidelines profit is allocated across 
countries, through the system of transfer pricing, based on the assumed value-added of 
different activities within the global value chain.  In practice, the guidelines allow MNCs 
to treat their routinized manufacturing activities in developing countries as low value-
added, assigning them a correspondingly small share of global profits. MNCs naturally 
prefer to assign as much value as possible to the owners of intellectual property and 
services, primarily in the OECD countries among which the rules were developed and 
where they are headquartered, or in tax havens. Emerging markets and their allies 
contend that the OECD approach allows firms to undervalue the activities that tend to 
occur in developing countries, thus denying them their rightful share of global profits and 
tax revenues.21 
 
These critiques are reinforced by the risk of more powerful states defecting from the 
OECD guidelines and defining national rules that give them a larger share of the tax base. 
For the most part the incentives to conform exceed those to defect, but larger, more 
economically powerful countries have at times successfully adapted the rules in their 
favor. Illustratively, when the United States adopted new transfer pricing rules at the turn 
of the 1990s, commentators quickly identified the revised rules as a political move to 
                                                 
20 Cobham, Alex, and Petr Jansky. 2018. "Global Distribution of Revenue Loss from Tax 
Avoidance: Re-estimation and Country Results." Journal of International Development 
30(2):206-232 
21 United Nations, Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries, First edition 




claim a greater share of the global tax base.22 This forced other OECD states to decide 
whether to accommodate US changes or risk double taxation, and subsequent 
negotiations saw compromise rules adopted into the OECD guidelines, as other states 
acquiesced to US economic power and effectively granted them a larger share of the 
global ‘tax pie’.23 
 
Against this background, the OECD, with endorsement from the G20, launched what 
came to be known as the BEPS project in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 
2008-09.  The unprecedented reform program aimed to “ensure that profits are taxed 
where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is 
created,” with the arm’s length principle near the heart of the discussions.24  While driven 
by tax concerns within OECD countries, the process involved broad global consultations, 
with the OECD presenting itself not as a representative of OECD states, but as a 
convening body, consulting globally, and directed by the more representative G20.  
Ultimately, the BEPS final reports and recommendations, published in 2015, amounted to 
the most significant proposed revisions to international tax rules in at least a generation, 
with over 100 countries signing the shrewdly-titled ‘Inclusive Framework’ on BEPS, 
which has since begun to be implemented around the world.   
 
However, despite some significant initiatives, the BEPS proposals failed to fully address 
the concerns of developing countries and large emerging markets, including China.25  
Most critically to the discussion here, the OECD actively defended OECD guidelines on 
                                                 
22 Radaelli, “Game Theory and Institutional Entrepreneurship” 
23 ibid 
24 OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2013). 
25 Independent Commission on Aid Impact, “UK Aid’s Contribution to Tackling Tax Avoidance 




ALP, resisting pressure for the exploration of more effective and equitable options.26  
BEPS thus made adjustments to the international tax regime that met the needs of OECD 
member states, while leaving unresolved some of the tensions between its members and 
other countries.27 
 
China’s rapidly evolving interests and influence 
 
The traditional dividing line in international tax debates has been between those that 
export capital (historically, OECD countries) and those that import it, with the latter 
constrained by the OECD’s guidelines on applying the ALP. Historically, China was 
easily placed in the latter group, but it increasingly defies easy categorization: it officially 
became a net capital exporter in 2016,28 but also remains a major recipient of inward 
investment.  
 
China’s correspondingly shifting interests can be seen in relation to bilateral tax treaties, 
which translate OECD soft law into hard law. These treaties broadly serve to constrain 
the taxing rights of capital importing countries.  However, there have historically been 
two global models, maintained by the OECD and UN, with the latter imposing fewer 
restrictions on capital importing developing countries. In its earliest negotiations, China 
was willing to accept treaties with OECD members on their terms, despite the fiscal 
                                                 
26 Tim Buttner and Matthias Thiemann, ‘Breaking Regime Stability? The Politicization of 
Expertise in the OECD G20 Process on BEPS and the Potential Transformation of 
International Taxation’, Accounting, Economics, and Law: A Convivium, 7(1), 2017; 
Wouter Lips. “Great powers in global tax governance: a comparison of the US role in the 
CRS and BEPS”, Globalizations, 2018. 
27 Taxation of the digital economy, the most contentious issue among OECD members 
themselves, was also left unresolved. 




costs, in order to send the signal that it was open to investment.29 However, in subsequent 
treaties with OECD countries it has used its growing power to successfully push for 
clauses from the UN model treaty that expand its taxing rights. For example, not only 
was its 1986 tax treaty with the United States the first to be signed by a US President 
rather than a lower-ranking diplomat, it was also “particularly generous” towards China, 
so much so that the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee included a disclaimer in its 
official report that the treaty could not act as a precedent for subsequent negotiations with 
other countries.30 Meanwhile, China’s tax treaties with recipients of its foreign direct 
investment have moved in the opposite direction, as it has become more aggressive than 
OECD countries themselves in negotiating advantageous clauses with less developed 
countries.31 This Janus-faced stance has been unique to China, and not shared to the same 
extent by other BRICS negotiators in their treaty negotiations with developing 
countries.32 
 
These competing impulses are indicative of the need to step beyond the traditional capital 
importer/exporter dichotomy in analysing China’s interests. The Chinese State 
Administration of Tax (SAT)’s view is set out in a book chapter written by two of its 
senior officials.33 The officials emphasise China’s unique characteristics as a developing 
country, but also argue that its position in the world economy is changing, and with it 
                                                 
29 Eduardo Baistrocchi, ‘The International Tax Regime and the BRIC World: Elements for a 
Theory’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 33 (2013), 733–66 
30 Paul D Reese ‘United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries: The China 
Example’, UCLA Law Review, 35 (1987), 369-397, p386 
31 Jinyan Li, ‘The Great Fiscal Wall of China: Tax Treaties and Their Role in Defining and 
Defending China’s Tax Base’, Bulletin for International Taxation, 66 (2012), 452–79 
 
33 Tizhong Liao and Li Hanli, ‘China: International Taxation in the Post-BEPS Era’, in Asian 





China’s tax priorities. They identify four such shifts, set out in Table 1, which also 
constitute four axes of conflict between states. China expects in the future to become a 
net exporter of capital, to move its comparative advantage from low-skilled towards high-
skilled labour, to become increasingly driven by domestic demand – driving a shift in its 
current account towards more imports and fewer exports – and to upgrade its position in 
global value chains towards high-skilled high-value added research and development. 
 
Table 1: Changes in China's economic position emphasised by SAT officials 
 Economic shift Implied change in tax cooperation objectives 
1 Capital-importing to capital-exporting 
Reduce the overseas tax burden of Chinese 
investors 
2 Factor-driven to innovation-driven 
Increase share of tax base from intellectual 
property development and royalties  
3 World factory to world market 
Increase share of tax base from marketing 
activities 
4 
From modernisation of manufacturing to full 
value-chain modernisation 
Increase share of tax base from research and 
development 
Source: Liao & Hanli, 2017 
 
These shifts explain China’s changing interests around international taxation. In the past 
China’s interests were closely aligned with other developing countries, with a focus on 
how to effectively tax subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in China.  In the future its 
interests appear set to more closely resemble those of capital exporting, high value-added 
OECD countries. In the present it faces the need for policy solutions that meet both needs 
at once: satisfying its immediate revenue needs as a major recipient of low valued-added 
foreign investment, while ensuring that those same rules will provide maximum future 
benefits to Chinese firms investing overseas, and increasingly focusing on intellectual 




efficiency-driven economy. And China will quickly become an innovation-driven 
economy,” its most senior international tax official told a conference in 2017.34   
 
China’s interests are changing, but what about its influence over international tax rules? 
China has a particularly strong position in international tax negotiations because the same 
economic transition that is changing its preferences is also strengthening demand from 
multinational firms to access it markets. This perspective differs from those such as 
Lukas Hakelberg who, building on Daniel Drezner, equate power in the taxation of 
multinational companies with market size.35 As China’s share of inward and outward FDI 
stocks is an order of magnitude lower than those of the US and EU, Hakelberg concludes 
that it cannot be regarded as a ‘great power’. 
 
We take a different view. Power in the double taxation regime begins from autonomy, the 
ability to break with the multilateral consensus without fearing negative investor 
reaction.36  Absolute market size understates this form of power because it omits three 
important variables: growth, profitability and integration into global value chains. First, 
growth. China is undergoing huge economic and social shifts that make it a uniquely 
attractive place to do business. By one measure its middle class already spends more in 
total than that in the US,37 and its consumer market growth, at six percent per year, far 
                                                 
34 Quoted in Mark Melnicoe, “Liao: International Tax Rules Must Adapt to China’s Rise,” 
Transfer Pricing Report 24 (2015): 685. 
35  Lukas Hakelberg, “Coercion in International Tax Cooperation: Identifying the Prerequisites for 
Sanction Threats by a Great Power.” Review of International Political Economy 23.3 
(2016): 511–541. Web. 
36 In the context of bond markets, Layna Mosley refers to this as ‘Room to Move’. See Layna 
Mosley ‘Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States’, 
International Organization, 54 (2000), 737–73 
37 Homi Kharas, The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Middle Class: An update, 




outstrips Western countries.38 Meanwhile, as it upgrades its position in value chains, 
China is predicted to overtake the US as the world’s largest source of patent applications 
by 2020.39 China’s attraction to investors is thus about future potential as well as present 
performance. Second, profitability: this relatively new and rapidly growing consumer 
market is relatively untapped in many areas, has a taste for foreign goods and services, 
and its likely to be more willing to pay a premium for higher quality products as 
disposable income increases.40 Together with China’s continued position at the top of 
manufacturing competitiveness rankings,41 investments in China are attractive and 
profitable propositions in the present day. Third, value chain positioning: Chinese 
manufacturing has become indispensable to the production of a huge proportion of 
products consumed in the West, most iconically the iPhone, a position that is becoming 
increasingly institutionalized through specialized regional manufacturing hubs, in which 
“China is turning scale‐driven specialization into a persistent competitive advantage.”42 
These three types of advantages give China some room to impose moderate increases in 
tax costs – such as those multinational firms might incur when a country deviates from 
rules based on the international consensus – without jeopardizing its competitive position. 
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Having considered China’s interests and its ability to make policy autonomously, the 
third part of our schema concerns the problem structure of international taxation. Unlike 
areas such as international finance, where power-as-autonomy does not necessarily 
translate into power-as-influence,43 large states that are willing and able to act 
unilaterally have disproportionate influence in the international tax regime. This is 
because of the powerful incentives for global consensus, to avoid the proliferation of 
multiple standards that might create double taxation. This gives states with large market 
power significant leverage over the OECD countries who designed the present day 
consensus. Much like the US in the 1990s, Chinese unilateralism puts pressure on other 
states to reach accommodations to avoid the emergence of double taxation. 
 
Location specific advantages: China’s challenge to the ALP 
 
China has faced a unique challenge in seeking to pursue its complex, rapidly changing 
interests on the global stage. The fragmented nature of bilateral treaties allowed it to 
pursue different strategies in different contexts, and to leverage its economic power in 
bilateral negotiations. By contrast, being brought inside the multilateral BEPS process 
has required China to navigate its changing and competing interests within a single set of 
global negotiations, while defending its position in the face of opposition from the bulk 
of the OECD at once.  The most visible and central aspect of this complex positioning is 
in China’s approach to the ALP.  Publicly, it has remained a steadfast supporter of the 
OECD BEPS process, through which the ALP retains its place at the heart of global tax 
rules.  Yet more quietly it has progressively advanced a substantial challenge to OECD 
orthodoxy.  
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The most authoritative statement of China’s view on the ALP is found not in its own 
domestic tax regulations, but in the ‘Country Practices’ chapter of a United Nations 
publication, the Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing, published in 2013, and updated in 
2017. Although China elaborated new transfer pricing regulations in 2016 and 2017, they 
did not contain specific rules on the matters discussed in this article, and so the UN 
manual remains the most authoritative and detailed statement of the SAT’s position.44 As 
three tax practitioners from law firm Baker Mackenzie wrote in an industry journal soon 
after the first edition was published: 
Although China is just beginning to revamp its transfer pricing practices, it 
has already made a big splash internationally with the China Chapter of the 
UN Manual. The response to the UN Manual has been far greater than 
expected, with numerous articles, seminars and client meetings discussing its 
principles.45 
 
In the first edition, SAT officials frame China’s position as follows: “As a developing 
country, China faces a number of difficult challenges, to many of which ready answers 
have not been found from the OECD guidelines.”46 In the 2017 edition, written after the 
BEPS process had concluded, they add that “China needs to strike a balance between 
conforming to international conventions and acknowledging its unique situation in 
transfer pricing legislation and practice.”47 In similar fashion, the Chinese representative 
to an OECD led consultation on March 19, 2015 argued bluntly that the arm’s length 
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principle “does not work in most cases.”48 This is not merely a matter of administrative 
simplification: Chinese officials conclude in the 2017 UN manual that there remains a 
broader question of “how to divide the pie between countries that are the location of 
economic activity and value creation.”49 
 
The centrepiece of China’s answer to this question is the concept of location specific 
advantages (LSA).50  Imagine an MNC that relocates a key aspect of its manufacturing 
operations from a high cost location (e.g. the United States) to a lower-cost jurisdiction 
(e.g. China). The manufacturing activity in China generates a ‘routine’ profit, but the 
MNC may also generate substantial additional profits as a result of the arbitrage. OECD 
rules generally allow MNCs to attribute these additional profits away from their local 
operating companies and towards other areas of the firm, in particular its home country or 
a tax haven intermediary, commonly through payments for the use of intangible assets. 
The host country subsidiary, by contrast, is only assigned a limited profit margin, 
consistent with being a simple contract manufacturer.  As described by Li and Ji: “The 
default position is that benefits from location savings are allocated away from the local 
subsidiary.”51  A Chinese government document argues this point as follows: 
For a long time, in their competition with developing countries for more tax 
resources (tax base), developed countries have obtained most of the benefits 
generated by MNEs by relying on their dominant position in formulating the 
rules and superiority in technology and intangible property, while developing 
countries have obtained a very small share of the profits even though they 
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have paid a price [for such profits] through providing huge market, cheap 
labour, using energy resources and damaging the environment.52 
 
The Chinese contention – embedded in the LSA concept – is that a portion of the ‘super 
profits’ that arise by virtue of operating in China should accrue, for tax purposes, to the 
Chinese subsidiary. As the Baker Mackenzie article cited earlier explained to its audience 
of tax practitioners: 
Most multinationals do not realize that their strategy of allocating “routine 
profits” to China is under severe attack. To quote a Chinese tax director who 
has negotiated extensively with the Chinese tax authorities, “[i]t became clear 
that the State Administration of Taxation believes China has unique factors, 
including location savings and market premiums, that are not addressed by 
the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines [...]”53 
 
 
The SAT position is that China offers advantages not available anywhere else, which 
means firms operating in China are more profitable than comparable firms elsewhere. 
This might include a large, skilled labour force, high quality infrastructure, unique 
expertise, agglomeration benefits, and a large, relatively untapped consumer market. 
Table 2 gives six types of LSAs in an example given by China in the UN transfer pricing 
manual, in an entry that notes how: “The automotive industry is a good example where 
there are many LSAs that have led to extraordinarily high profits that are rightly earned 
by Chinese taxpayers.”54  Here one can roughly distinguish two types of LSAs: ‘location 
savings’ which result from more efficient and lower cost production in a particular 
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location, and more controversial ‘market premiums’ which reflect access to a uniquely 
valuable local market. A simple example of a location saving would be the lower cost to 
manufacture a given unit of a product because of lower wages and higher productivity in 
China than in its competitors. At its simplest, a market premium would result if, for 
example, Chinese consumers were willing to pay more for a product than those in other 
countries. 
 




Importing parts and assembling them domestically incurs lower duty 
rates than those levied on competing imported vehicles. 
There is a large supply of high quality, low cost parts made locally. 
Market 
premiums 
Foreign firms are obliged to supply technology to the local 
manufacturing subsidiary at lower prices to access the Chinese market, 
increasing the latter’s profitability. 
Chinese consumers have a “general preference for foreign brands and 
imported products” that mean MNCs can charge higher prices. 
The large consumer market creates “huge, inelastic demand for 
automotive vehicles in China.” 
There are capacity constraints on the supply of domestically assembled 
automotive vehicles, reducing competition. 
Source: UN transfer pricing manual/Peng (2017) 
 
China’s implementation of LSAs – both location savings and market premia – increases 
the share of MNCs’ profits that should be assigned to their Chinese subsidiaries to be 
taxed, but in doing so it violates the ALP. First, China regards LSAs as a way of 
internalising value-adding characteristics of the local market within a firm’s profits. 
Some of the items in Table 2 are direct or indirect government subsidies, while others are 
demand and supply characteristics of local markets. All of them create opportunities for 




markets. According to Tizhong Liao, Director General of International Taxation of the 
SAT: 
 
Value is created by capital, by labor, by intangibles, but all of this happens in 
the market. The market has comparative advantage. The market has specific 
characteristics, which differ from one country to another, which explains why 
some companies lose money in their own market but once they move to 
China make a huge amount of money.55 
 
The emphasis on intrinsic properties of the market here points to a key difference in 
China’s interpretation of LSAs, in comparison to the orthodox OECD position. The 
OECD, as articulated by Robert Stack, the lead US representative to the BEPS process, is 
that “the mere presence of a market is not an asset of the taxpayer to which profits are 
typically allocated under the guidelines.”56 This is because, while a market may offer 
certain advantages of the nature described by China, firms need to capture these 
advantages as location-specific rents if they are to be relevant to an assessment of the 
firm’s profitability. OECD rules presume that this does not take place, and that the LSAs 
lead instead to lower consumer prices or more profits for independent contractors. 
Central to the conceptual challenge presented by China’s use of LSAs is the presumption 
that foreign investors come to China in search of LSAs, and successfully capture them as 
rents. 
 
Indicative of these tensions, the Indian tax authority has sought to implement a similar 
approach, but has stumbled at this conceptual hurdle, with Indian courts rejecting the use 
of LSAs by the Indian tax authority unless it can demonstrate that the taxpayer has 
actually captured resultant rents.57 The legal culture and institutions of tax administration 
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in China mean that the SAT does not face a similar threat of being overruled by courts, 
and, indeed, there is no public record of any disputes over the use of LSAs.58 The SAT 
has thus not needed to draw the same distinction between local specific advantages and 
rents as its Indian counterpart, enabling it to capture a greater share of taxable profits. 
 
In addition to the general existence of LSAs, China argues that the share of profits 
assigned to Chinese firms should likely increase over time as local subsidiaries become 
less dependent on foreign intellectual property, and begin to contribute greater innovation 
and local expertise. An example given by Chinese officials is the Head & Shoulders 
brand name, owned by US firm Procter & Gamble, which has been given a Chinese name 
that translates as “fly in my hair in the windy sea.”59 China argues that local subsidiaries 
should be more effectively rewarded for the value created by ‘materializing’ foreign 
intellectual property in this way, in combination with the power of the local market, as 
Liao explains: 
 
You may have a trademark in your jurisdiction, and that trademark has its 
original market share. But it has a new market share once it's introduced into 
China. The market share grows hugely, dramatically. Because of the 
geographical coverage, because of the demographic coverage, because of the 
growth and increase of the effectiveness of demand of this population, the 
growth of demand leads to growth of value. We believe the increase of the 
value because of the increase of the market share should be remunerated.60 
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A third and even more contentious element of China’s use of LSAs elevates the debate 
from a relatively technical level to a much larger conceptual challenge to the ALP itself.  
OECD rules have historically proposed that the profitability of an MNC subsidiary 
should be assessed in isolation, in comparison to a locally-owned independent enterprise.  
By contrast, LSAs imply that “you should take the group as a whole.”61 As the Chinese 
contribution to the UN transfer pricing manual in 2017 states: 
 
With more and more companies poised to conduct business as groups, 
economic activities are more and more likely to take place in the inner circle 
of MNE groups. It is nearly impossible to take out one piece of a value chain 
of an MNE group and try to match it to comparable transactions/companies.62 
 
It is this collapsing of the legal fiction that an MNC can be modelled as a group of 
separate entities trading at arm’s length that enables China to capture a share of the 
group’s ‘super-profits’ within its tax base.  Chinese subsidiaries are, in their view, 
entitled to a share of group profits consistent with their overall contribution to value 
creation of the MNC group. 
 
The importance of the Chinese position is reflected in public comments made by Robert 
Stack, the United States’ BEPS representative: 
 
The OECD countries all ascribe [sic] to the arm’s-length standard and to what 
they call the basic OECD principles. Other countries have not signed on to 
the full implementation of the arm’s-length standard and the OECD 
guidelines, even countries that are in the G-20. And the reason this is very 
important is the question of market premium and intangibles that relate to 
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markets and things like location-specific advantages that are specifically 
talked about in the OECD guidelines....[China should] not pick a rifle-shot 
issue that favors a large-market country and try to gerrymander the debate 
from that narrow issue.63 
 
While these comments are packaged in technical language, such public comments 
condemning the Chinese approach, by a senior official in the negotiations, are suggestive 
of the depth – and significance – of the Chinese challenge. 
 
Yet despite significant reservations, the OECD has agreed to meet China halfway. During 
the BEPS discussions, OECD member states quietly accepted that location savings can be 
taken into account when assessing the profits made by local subsidiaries.64 In turn, China 
has sought to align its practical application of LSAs closer to the logic of the OECD 
guidelines.65 China’s application of LSAs remains more expansive than what OECD 
members would prefer, or are comfortable codifying in OECD guidelines.  But these 
compromises have created adequate space for China to continue with current practices, 
while avoiding any open conflict over broader OECD rules. 
 
There has, by contrast, been no explicit compromise over the ‘market premiums’ 
component of LSAs. For the reasons outlined above, China’s position here is even more 
at odds with the OECD-led international consensus. That position is expressed clearly in 
a Chinese government document: 
 
China has a huge population and a fast-growing middle class that form a great 
market capacity and huge consumer groups. This factor is unique in the world 
and inimitable by other small and medium-sized developing countries. Those 
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MNCs which occupy major market shares in China should fully consider and 
quantify the contribution of this factor.66 
 
China’s increasing focus on market premiums – and OECD resistance to them – appears 
linked to China’s planned transition from “world factory to world market”, which will 
make market premiums increasingly important in tax terms.  And for the time being 
China appears to be moving ahead with the inclusion of market premiums in its 
calculation of LSAs, despite OECD objections.  
Beyond Conflict versus Cooperation 
 
Existing literature on China’s role in global economic governance has tended, explicitly 
or implicitly, to present a dichotomy: would China seek to cooperate with existing, 
western-led, global institutions, or to challenge or undermine them?  Most of the 
literature has pointed toward relatively cooperative strategies, integrating into existing 
institutions while pushing for only modest “balancing” reforms.67  This has been 
mirrored in the rhetoric of OECD governments that have sought to “socialize” China into 
existing frameworks of global economic governance, in hopes of forestalling more 
aggressive Chinese efforts to exploit their growing economic power on the global stage.68 
 
However, recent debates over international tax rules defy easy characterization.  On one 
hand, China has been a vocal supporter of the OECD BEPS process, contributing to 
broad global endorsement of the BEPS recommendations.  On the other hand, it has 
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quietly but forcefully advanced significant challenges to the status quo.  In 
simultaneously acting as a vocal supporter of existing institutions and seeking to carve 
out special treatments and benefits, China’s engagement increasingly appears to mirror 
the strategies historically adopted by the United States.69  In what follows we identify 
three overlapping ways in which the story of LSAs sheds light on China’s emerging 
global ambition: it points toward a more assertive Chinese stance within multilateral 
negotiations than has generally been portrayed in existing literature; it highlights China’s 
conceptualisation of its interests as unique, diverging from traditional alliances; and it 
speaks to the extent to which China’s growing market power is enhancing its global 
power, and ability to force others to accommodate its preferences. 
 
Consider first the subtle assertiveness on display through China’s advocacy for LSAs. 
While China has expressed substantial misgivings about OECD rules, its official stance 
has been public and supportive.  During China’s G20 leadership in 2016 official 
communiques and statements from the SAT repeatedly highlighted the importance of the 
BEPS project.70  Meanwhile, China moved quickly and prominently to implement key 
BEPS recommendations.71  In official OECD forums China has muted its critiques, while 
participating actively in BEPS consultations – sometimes in leadership roles.72  China has 
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worked with the OECD to establish an OECD training center in China, offering a visible 
signal of close engagement.  A senior OECD official described that the “most important 
unifying factor is they are very engaged” – “they turn up to all of the meetings, of which 
there are 100s” and “they seem generally not to fight.”73  This stands in contrast to other 
large emerging markets. Brazil, for example, employs simplified transfer pricing rules 
that make it the only major economy not to follow the OECD guidelines, and pushed for 
the UN transfer pricing manual to become a forum for emerging markets to articulate 
contrasting views.74  Likewise, India has most actively pushed for an intergovernmental 
UN tax body and recently contributed funds to the UN’s tax work – the only state to have 
done so. 
 
Yet while China has offered surprising outward support for historically western-led 
institutions, it has simultaneously used the cover offered by complex technical debates to 
pursue very significant challenges to existing rules.  At a minimum, China’s push for the 
use of LSAs domestically – and for their partial inclusion in OECD guidelines – has been 
a relatively aggressive effort to secure a larger share of the global tax pie, with rules 
tailored to China’s purportedly unique characteristics.  Seen more expansively, the 
Chinese position poses more profound challenge to the foundations of the ALP, and thus 
to OECD orthodoxy, cutting near the heart of a key feature of global economic rules that 
have prevailed for almost a century.  Against this background, China’s engagement with 
the OECD is best understood not as cooperative or conflictual, but as a strategic mix of 
both.  Rather than seeking to tear down key pillars of the existing institutional 
infrastructure, it has instead obtained a seat at the table in the OECD’s technical bodies, 
alongside political influence through the G20.  This so-called “G20 institutional 
transition”75 gives China significant continuity, the benefit of the OECD’s technical 
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expertise, and a more powerful voice as a member of a club of 20 than would be the case 
at the more inclusive UN. In this view, China’s flirtations with the United Nations appear 
to be a combination of good politics with other developing countries, and leverage in 
negotiating with the OECD.76 
 
There is a temptation to equate these developments with the “dual track” strategies 
adopted in the realms of trade and development aid: cooperating with existing 
institutions, while challenging the status quo through parallel initiatives outside of those 
institutions.  However, the case of international taxation is different. Because the 
coordination problem of international tax rules requires a universal set of global rules, 
China has had to develop strategies to achieve both its short and long term economic 
goals simultaneously within a single set of global negotiations and rules, while 
confronting explicit resistance by the entire group of OECD states. In this context the 
Chinese focus on LSAs appears ingenious.  LSAs pose a potentially profound challenge 
to OECD orthodoxy, but China has found ways to present them as a simple extension of 
– and improvement on – OECD guidelines.77  This has allowed the OECD to make 
relatively modest changes to its rules, which have provided enough cover for China to 
pursue a more far-reaching implementation of LSAs domestically without coming into 
direct conflict with the OECD. In this respect Brazil offers a telling contrast: the OECD 
has consistently rejected including Brazil's simplified approach to taxing MNCs in the 
OECD guidelines, while informing Brazil that changes to its transfer pricing rules would 
be a pre-condition for joining the OECD.78  
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Critically, these compromises appear aimed not at generating general benefits for all 
developing countries, but at carving out special benefits for China.  Rhetorically, China 
has presented itself as a champion of developing country concerns.  A SAT webpage 
approvingly quotes a Chinese academic observing that: “The formulation of the global 
tax rules has long been dominated by developed countries, with appeals of developing 
countries not taken into full consideration.”79  It goes on to document concerns common 
to a wide range of developing countries.  Yet China’s practical commitment to 
representing developing country interests appears increasingly uncertain, despite the 
provision of gradually increasing technical assistance.  Its advocacy of LSAs appears 
likely to carry benefits to China, which will come at the expense of developing, as well as 
OECD, countries, given the official view that China’s market premium is “unique in the 
world and inimitable by other small and medium-sized developing countries.”80  This 
appears equally reflected elsewhere: China has pursued a similarly self-interested 
approach to bilateral tax treaties, while insiders claim that China has likewise abandoned 
support in recent years for proposals designed to strengthen the ability of developing 
countries to tax technical service fees and digital firms. Ultimately, focusing on LSAs 
strengthens China’s hand in trying to tax OECD MNCs, without risking the imposition of 
additional taxation on Chinese MNCs operating in developing countries.   
 
Recent writing on so-called ‘Chinese Exceptionalism’ has drawn attention to China’s 
rhetorical focus on being a “new kind of global power”, emphasizing peace and 
accommodation.81  However, that literature has also highlighted the tension between 
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official ideologies stressing cooperation and China’s desire to reclaim its former status as 
a great power.82  The experience of international tax reform points toward the importance 
of the latter in contributing to an emerging form of exceptionalism.  In this case at least, 
and mirroring the United States before it, China’s purportedly exceptional characteristics 
have acted as justification for using its market power to press for unique advantages.  
More broadly, China has been strategically Janus-faced: presenting a more cooperative 
public face, while pursuing more specific and narrow benefits in parallel.  In retrospect it 
is perhaps unsurprising that China would exploit its growing market power to pursue 
such advantages, while shifting its focus away from meaningful solidarity with other 
developing countries.  Yet both developments stand in contrast to earlier trends in 
China’s engagement in multilateral fora, and suggest the rapid evolution of China’s 
priorities and capabilities in relation to global economic governance. 
 
Conclusion: What Comes Next? 
 
The recent reform of international tax rules offers a fresh look at Chinese engagement 
with global economic governance, and challenges dominant narratives.  Far from a 
cautious participant, China has been highly visible in recent reform efforts, has embraced 
and implemented significant new global rules and has diplomatically but forcefully 
secured a profound, if subtle, change to those rules.  It has, in turn, diverged still further 
from global rules in its domestic implementation by exploiting the margins available to a 
powerful state when implementing global soft law.  Indeed, the very same location 
specific advantages that China seeks to tax offer it significant market power and 
negotiating leverage, allowing it to break from the OECD consensus without jeopardising 
the prospect of inward investment.  While China’s approach to international tax rules 
presents parallels to the literature on “dual track” strategies, what we describe is 
nonetheless quite different, as China has pursued its objectives not through parallel 
                                                 




institutions, but through direct negotiation with powerful OECD states. In turn, this 
account moves beyond the common debate over whether Chinese strategies will be 
cooperative or conflictual: so far they have been both, calibrated to pragmatically 
maximize Chinese benefits. 
 
In adopting these positions and strategies China increasingly resembles the global 
superpower that came before it: the United States.  To be sure, because China is emerging 
alongside the already established OECD powers it has moved diplomatically, seeking to 
present its approach to international taxation as an extension of OECD rules rather than a 
repudiation of them.  But it seems clear to observers – and is acknowledged by 
individuals with close knowledge of the negotiations – that the OECD ultimately 
accepted a compromise with China on LSAs because China had significant leverage, 
while compromise was viewed as an acceptable price to pay to secure Chinese 
engagement and cooperation.83  The same logic has applied to the United States in tax 
cooperation and across a host of domains of global economic governance over several 
decades.  In that sense China’s strategy is in some ways unremarkable: it is more clearly 
now doing what powerful states have always done.  It appears surprising primarily in 
contrast to hopeful narratives about the possibility that China might more actively 
advocate on behalf of developing countries, and more skeptical narratives that have cast 
doubt on China’s capacity to craft a coherent and unified global strategy.84  
 
What remains unclear is what might come next, both for international tax rules and for 
global economic governance more broadly. The BEPS process only ever offered 
relatively limited potential for change at the global level, as it was “not designed to 
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rethink the arm’s length principle [in order] to assign more value to productive activities 
and markets in both developing countries and developed countries.”85  We suggest that 
the future may move in two broad directions.   
 
First, the strategies described here may offer a relatively clear view of China’s emerging 
approach.  China will seek to exploit its market power to secure specific advantages, and 
increase its visibility as a global power, but while minimizing conflict and avoiding 
undermining core pillars of the existing institutional order.  In this view China’s 
engagement is increasingly coherent and assertive, but fundamentally pragmatic and 
incrementalist.  Recognizing that its long-term interests are likely to increasingly align 
with those of the old powers, a combination of incremental changes at global level and 
selective unilateralism offers greater flexibility to adapt as China’s place in the global 
economy evolves.   
 
Second, by design or accident the Chinese challenge to the ALP may prove to be the first 
step in a process of more dramatic reform, which will place increasing stress on existing 
institutions and rules.  To accept the premise of LSAs is to concede that the purportedly 
“neutral” ALP promoted by the OECD in fact has important distributional implications, 
biasing the system against developing countries.  Such a discussion was explicitly taken 
off the table during the BEPS negotiations.86 Yet by opening cracks in the existing 
system, LSAs may lead other countries – perhaps led by other large emerging markets – 
to seek their own accommodations, thus placing increasing strain on the multilateral 
foundations of the international tax system.  While far from assured, the potential for 
initially small challenges to existing orthodoxy to create a snowball effect of expanding 
challenges can be seen in other aspects of recent international debates.  The UN Transfer 
Pricing Manual, in which China initially presented its critique of the ALP, had initially 
only intended to feature a brief discussion of the Brazilian approach to transfer pricing 
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enforcement.  However, the inclusion of one alternative approach prompted China, India 
and others to seek chapters detailing their own unique national experiences.  Similarly, 
recent years have seen OECD led efforts to develop multilateral guidelines for taxing the 
digital economy be increasingly challenged by pragmatic, but unilateral, national 
legislation, with each new national law enhancing incentives for other states to adopt 
their own unique solutions, but at risk of undermining the multilateral framework.  It 
remains to be seen whether China’s successful challenge to the ALP will similarly 
prompt subsequent challenges from elsewhere. 
 
